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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a tractable mathematical model to examine the optimal structure of
a public broadcasting company. We then compare four possible scenarios from a welfare perspective:
a public broadcasting company continues operating, is scrambled, is disbanded or is privatized. In
our setting, the situation where only some households choose scrambling is inferior to the situation
where all households pay a license fee. However, if the need for the public broadcasting company is
low, it should be disbanded. Under a uniform distribution, this reference point is that more than
50% of households agree to disband the public broadcasting company; however, this percentage is
crucially dependent on the shape of the distribution. Our model also suggests that privatization of a
public broadcasting company is superior to disbandment if the number of commercial broadcasting
company is smaller than social optimum number.
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1 Introduction
Globally, there are many public broadcasting companies, for example, BBC in Britain, ARD and ZDF in
Germany, FTV in France, YLR in Finland, EBS in Korea, and NHK in Japan. They operate broadcasting
stations funded by a license fee paid by citizens living in their respective countries. 1 Such stations have
created many interesting TV programs, and have played a special role in times of stress like natural
disasters or terrible accidents. However, in recent years, the role of public broadcasting companies has
been questioned following the entry of many cable operators, the diversification of customers’ recreation
activities and an expansion of Internet-based substitute services. This point is sometimes raised as a
question in party policies; for example, the United Kingdom’s prime minister mentioned the possibility
of reconsidering the license fee system in the general election of 2019, and Minister of Internal Affairs
and Communications in Japan has frequently made reference to the NHK license fee in recent years.
Generally, political arguments tend to be biased in one direction. In this paper, we then provide
an objective viewpoint based on economic theory using a tractable mathematical model. We construct
a one-shot static model where households, which have heterogeneous tastes with respect to watching
TV, obtain utility from consumption and watching TV. There are two types of broadcasting companies:
commercial and public. On the one hand, commercial broadcasting companies create TV programs
using advertising-revenue funding from producers of consumption goods. On the other hand, public
broadcasting company creates TV programs funded by license-fee revenue from households. Using this
model, we compare three political options from a welfare perspective. The first option is that the public
broadcasting company continues operating. Under this option, every household pays a license fee, and we
refer to this as the “continued economy”. The second option is that households are granted the option
to choose scrambling. Some households will choose scrambling, while others will choose non-scrambling
when enough households prefer watching TV programs created by a public broadcasting company; we
refer to this economy as the “scrambled economy”. However, every households choose scrambling when
the majority of households place little value on public broadcasting, and we refer to this as the “disbanded
economy”. The third option is that the public broadcasting company is privatized. In this economy, the
public broadcasting company transforms into a commercial broadcasting company, and we refer to this
economy as a “privatized economy”.
1There are various names for such license fees; for example, television license fee, broadcast receiving license fee, public
broadcasting tax (Yle tax), reception fee, etc. In this paper, we use the term license fee to cover all such possibilities.
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In this paper, we determine which economy eventuates, and which economy is most desirable. Our
results depend crucially on a key variable: the need index for a public broadcasting company, which is
determined by the following: hours of TV watching; a relative preference for a public broadcasting com-
pany; efficiency in terms of investment in a public broadcasting company; and license fee as a percentage
of total household income. Our model provides six interesting results. First, the “continued economy”
is superior to the “scrambled economy” and “disbanded economy” when the need index for the public
broadcasting company is sufficiently high. Second, there is no case in which the “scrambled economy”
is superior to the “continued economy” in our model. Third, the “disbanded economy” is superior to
the “continued economy” when the need index for the public broadcasting company is low. Fourth, the
“disbanded economy” is superior to the “continued economy” even if the public broadcasting company
acts appropriately when the need index for the public broadcasting company is extremely low because of
a decrease in hours of TV watching or a deterioration of a relative preference for a public broadcasting
company. Fifth, the “disbanded economy” is superior to the “continued economy” when more than half of
households approve disbanding the public broadcasting company under a uniform distribution; however,
this percentage is crucially dependent on the shape of the preference distribution. Sixth, the “privatized
economy” is superior to the “disbanded economy” if the number of commercial broadcasting companies
is smaller than the socially optimal number.
This paper is related to previous studies, which we group into three categories. The first category
is papers examining public goods. Most broadcasted TV programs can be watched by every household
as long as they have a receiver: non-excludable. A large number of households can watch TV programs
simultaneously at the same quality: non-rivalrous. Goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous
are called public goods. Following Samuelson (1954), numerous papers have examined public goods. In
recent years, some papers have considered heterogeneity of preferences for public goods; for example,
Epple and Sieg (1999), Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2009), and
Teulings, Ossokina and Groot (2018). 2 Our model considers heterogeneity of tastes for watching TV
program which has properties of public goods. In Section 3.2, we examine the policy granting the option
to choose scrambling. From a public goods perspective, we can interpret this policy as eliminating the
non-excludability property of TV programs created by public broadcasting company.
2Many studies in other fields have considered heterogeneity. For example, in growth theory, Iwaisako and Ohki (2019)
and Ohki (2019) examined the role of innovation under firm heterogeneity.
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The second category is papers examining public choice or new political economy, which examines
about the intersection between economics and political science, following Arrow (1951) and Black (1958).
Our model shows the minimum percentage of approvers of scrambling (disbanding) policy required in
order to increase social welfare. Our result can then provide a reference point for when governments
should adopt a scrambling (disbanding) policy.
The third category is papers examining broadcasting; for example, Steiner (1952), Spence and Owen
(1977), Beebe (1977), Nilssen and Sorgard (2000), Gal-Or and Dukes (2001), Cunningham and Alexander
(2004), Anderson and Coate (2005), and Anderson, Foros and Kind (2018). They mainly examined the
relationships between program diversity, market structure and viewer preferences. 3 As our model focuses
on the necessity of public broadcasting company, we construct our model as simply as possible. Then
we simplify these relationships discussed in the above-mentioned literature; however, we believe that
considering such factors enhances our model and that this extension is important for future work.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we construct a basic model. In Section 3.1, we examine
the welfare of the “continued economy”. In Section 3.2, we examine the welfare of the “scrambled
economy” and the “disbanded economy”, and compare these to the “continued economy”. In Section
3.3, we examine the welfare of the “privatized economy”, and compare it with the “disbanded economy”.
In Section 4, we generalize the distribution of taste for watching TV, and discuss how the shape of the
distribution affects our results.
2 Model
We construct a static model in which households, which have heterogeneous tastes for watching TV, obtain
utility from consumption and watching TV. There are two types of broadcasting companies: commercial
and public broadcasting. Using this model, we derive the equilibrium under three policy options. The
first option is to make every household pay a license fee. The second is to allow households the option
to select scrambling, and thus households that do not want to watch public broadcasting programs do
not have to pay a license fee. The third option is to disband the public broadcasting company, and
transform it into a commercial broadcasting company. We then compare these three options from a
welfare perspective.
3In addition to these studies, a series of studies about pulse auction, such as Milgrom (2004), can also be categorized
as papers examining broadcasting.
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2.1 Households
The number of households is exogenously given, and normalized as unity. Household members obtain
utility from consuming goods and from watching TV. They are heterogeneous in tastes for watching TV,
θ ∈ [0, 1]. In the basic model, we specify a uniform distribution as follows:4
g (θ) = 1 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 , (1)
Household members having θ maximize their utility as follows:
max
C,vC(j),vP
U (θ) = lnC + θ


n
∫
0
qC (j) [vC (j)]
1
2 dj + γqP [vP ]
1
2


2
, (2)
where C is consumption, qC (j) and vC (j) are the quality and hours watched of TV programs created by
commercial broadcasting company j respectively, n is the number of commercial broadcasting companies,
qP and vP are the quality and hours watched of TV programs created by public broadcasting company,
respectively, and γ is the relative preference for public broadcasting company. 5 Consumption goods are
provided by one industry, the preferences for which are expressed in natural logarithms. TV programs
are provided by n commercial broadcasting companies and one public broadcasting company, with CES
preferences, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 6
Households face two constraints. The first is a budget constraint as follows:
CP ≤ I − FL, (3)
where P is the price of consumption goods, I is income that is exogenously given and FL is a license fee
4In Section 4 and appendix B, we consider other distributions: linear distribution and discrete distribution respectively.
5Public broadcasting companies seem to differ from commercial broadcasting companies in certain ways. On the one
hand, public broadcasting companies can create unbiased news, educational, cultural and long-term documentary programs
because they are not subject to audience ratings, and their budget is guaranteed by a license fee. On the other hand, their
programs may be too formal and may not be exciting because they broadcast from a public perspective. In our model, TV
viewers evaluate programs from public broadcasting companies higher (lower) than that of commercial broadcast companies
when γ > 1 ( γ < 1).
6For analytical simplicity, we normalize the elasticity of substitution among the broadcasting companies to equal two.
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that is also exogenously given. 7 The second constraint is a time constraint as follows:
n
∫
0
vC (j) dj + vP ≤ V, (4)
where V is hours watching TV, which is exogenously given. 8 Solving the static utility maximization
problem of the household, we now derive the amount of consumption goods, hours watching commercial
broadcasting company j and hours watching the public broadcasting company as follows:
C = I−FL
P
vC (j) =
V [qC(j)]
2
n
∫
0
[qC(j)]
2dj+[γqP ]
2
vP =
V [γqP ]
2
n
∫
0
[qC(j)]
2dj+[γqP ]
2
, (5)
2.2 Commercial broadcasting companies
Commercial broadcasting companies create TV programs and obtain advertising revenue according to
viewer ratings. 9 A high viewer rating is interpreted as resulting from the high quality of the TV program.
Thus, the revenue of each commercial broadcasting company is expressed as a proportion of the aggregate
advertising revenue of the whole industry depending on their relative quality:
x (j) = PA
q (j)
Q
, (6)
where x (j) is the advertising revenue of commercial broadcasting company j, Q ≡
n
∫
0
q (j) dj is aggregate
quality, and PA is aggregate advertising revenue. Clients tend to pay high advertising rates when the
effectiveness of advertising is high, and then we assume that aggregate advertising revenue, PA, is an
increasing function of aggregate quality, Q, as follows:
PA = Q
β , (7)
7In this paper, we do not consider the labor market, and income is determined exogenously. Thus, we cannot capture the
effects of policy changes on labor demand, wage rate and income. Although this effect is important in general equilibrium
models, for simplicity we ignore it.
8In this paper, we do not consider the substitution among watching TV, enjoying other leisure activities and working.
Thus, we cannot capture the effect of policy changes on hours watching TV, which then affects hours enjoying other leisure
activities or working. Although this effect is important in general equilibrium models, for simplicity, we also ignore it.
9In the real economy, advertising rates are determined by various factors: popularity of the program, broadcast length,
bargaining power of commercial broadcasting company, business conditions of client, etc. Considering these factors would
make our model more sophisticated; however, for simplicity, we focus only on viewer ratings.
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where β < 1 is the elasticity of aggregate advertising revenue with respect to aggregate quality, which is
exogenously given. We assume that each commercial broadcasting company can improve its quality of
TV program by investing as follows:
qC (j) = 2
1
2 sC (j) [iC (j)]
1
2 , (8)
where sC is the efficiency of investing, which is exogenously given, i (j) is the amount of investment in
commercial broadcasting company j. We normalize the unit cost of investment to unity, and express the
profit of broadcasting company j as follows:
π (j) = x (j)− i (j)− f, (9)
where f is a fixed cost. Each commercial broadcasting company maximizes this profit function subject to
(6), (7) and (8). We restrict our analysis on the symmetric equilibrium by assuming that all commercial
broadcasting companies behave in the same way. Thus, we obtain endogenous variables in the symmetry
equilibrium as follows: 10
qC = [n]
−[1−β]
2−β [sC ]
2
2−β
iC =
1
2 [n]
−2[1−β]
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
πC =
1
2 [n]
2[β−1]
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β − f
Q = [n]
1
2−β [sC ]
2
2−β
. (10)
2.3 Consumption goods
We assume that the consumption goods are homogeneous. The price of the consumption goods, P ,
comprises advertising cost and other factors as follows: 11
P = αPA + P̄ , (11)
10Free entry is assumed in many papers. In this case, the profit of each company goes to zero, and n = [2f ]
2−β
2[β−1] s
−2β
2[β−1]
C
is satisfied. However, in this paper, we assume that n is exogenous because entry of commercial broadcasting companies is
restricted by the government in the real economy.
11In many papers, perfect competition is assumed among firms producing consumption goods. For example, we can set
the profit function as πC = PC − FV C − PA where FV is the variable production cost of the consumption goods. If the
consumption goods are produced in perfect competition, this profit goes to zero. Substituting (5), we obtain P =
FV [I−FL]
I−FL−PA
.
From this equation, we confirm that the price of the consumption goods is an increasing function of PA and that it comprises
other factors.
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where P̄ includes factors determining the price of the consumption goods excluding advertising cost,
which is exogenously given, and α is a parameter measuring the extent to which advertising cost raises
the price of the consumption goods.
2.4 Public broadcasting company
There is one public broadcasting company in the economy and it creates TV programs funded by a
license fee from households. The quality of TV programs created by the public broadcasting company is
expressed as follows:
qP = sP [iP ]
1
2 , (12)
where sP is the efficiency of investing, which is exogenously given, and iP is investment in the public
broadcasting company. The public broadcasting company invests part of the license fee from households
as follows:
iP = ωζFL, (13)
where ω ≤ 1 is the ratio of investment to the revenue of television license fee, which is exogenously given,
and ζ ≤ 1 is the rate of collection of the license fee. 12 Thus, the quality of the public broadcasting
company is expressed as follows:
qP = sP [ωζFL]
1
2 , (14)
3 Analysis
In this section, we compare some scenarios from a welfare perspective: public broadcasting company
continues to operate, the television programs of the public broadcasting company are scrambled for an
applicant, the public broadcasting company is dissolved completely, the public broadcasting company is
12According to the survey released by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan, the rate of collection
is 93.4% for BBC, 95.9% for ARD and ZDF, 90.7% for FTV, 99.9% for KBS and 82.1% for NHK. Public broadcasting
companies do not use the entire amount collected from license fees to improve the quality of TV programs. For example,
the ratio of the collection cost to the license fee is 2.7% for BBC, 2.2% for ARD and ZDF, 1.0% for FTV, 10.0% for KBS
and 10.8% for NHK.
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privatized.
3.1 Continued economy
In this subsection, we examine the welfare when the public broadcasting company continues to operate,
and every household pays a license fee. We call this economy the “continued economy”. Although the
rate of collection of the license fee is not 100% in the real economy as shown in footnote 12, license fees
are, in principle, imposed on all households in many countries. Thus, we assume that every household
pays a license fee, and we set the proportion of households paying a license fee in the “continued economy”
as follows:
ζ =
1
∫
0
dθ = 1, (15)
Substituting (5), (10), (14) and (15) into (2), we obtain the equilibrium value of the utility of households
having θ as follows:
UC (θ) = ln
I − FL
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
+ θV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ωFL
]
. (16)
As we assume θ follows a uniform distribution expressed as (1) , we obtain the welfare under the “continued
economy” as follows:
UC =
1
∫
0
UC (θ) g (θ) dθ. (17)
Substituting (1) and (16) into this equation, we obtain:
UC = ln
I − FL
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
+
1
2
V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ωFL
]
. (18)
3.2 Scrambled economy, disbanded economy
In this subsection, we derive the welfare when households are granted the option to choose scrambling
or non-scrambling. In this case, each household can choose whether to watch the TV program created
by the public broadcasting company and pay a license fee or not watch it and not pay a license fee. We
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call the former choice non-scrambling, and the latter choice scrambling. If a household having θ chooses
scrambling, their utility is expressed as follows:
USS (θ) = ln
I
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
+ θV [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β . (19)
By choosing scrambling, on the one hand, their utility increases because they do not pay the license
fee; however, on the other hand, they cannot watch TV programs created by the public broadcasting
company, which decreases their utility.
If a household having θ chooses non-scrambling, their utility is expressed as follows:
USN (θ) = ln
I − FL
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
+ θV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ωζFL
]
. (20)
Note that USN (θ) is inevitably smaller than UC (θ) because a decrease in the proportion of households
paying the license fee reduces the quality of the TV programs created by the public broadcasting company.
When households can choose scrambling or non-scrambling, the proportion of households paying a license
fee is expressed as follows:
ζ =
1
∫
θ∗
dθ = 1− θ∗, (21)
where θ∗ is the critical value as to whether households choose scrambling, which is determined endoge-
nously as:
ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+ θ∗V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ω [1− θ∗]FL
]
= ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+ θ∗V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β
]
. (22)
The LHS (RHS) of this equation expresses the utility of households having θ∗ when they choose non-
scrambling (scrambling). If the LHS of equation (22) is smaller (greater) than the RHS, the marginal
benefit of a household having θ∗ from choosing scrambling is greater (smaller) than the marginal cost,
and more households choose scrambling (non-scrambling), and θ∗ increases (decreases). The interior
equilibrium value of θ∗ is then determined at the point where the LHS equals the RHS.
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To check the stability visually, we rearrange (22) to obtain the following:
θ∗ [1− θ∗] =
1
X
, (23)
where
X = V [γsP ]
2
ωFL ln
I
I − FL
is the need index for the public broadcasting company. This index is an increasing function of hours
watching TV, V , the relative preference for the public broadcasting company, γ, the efficiency of investing
in the public broadcast company, sP , the investment rate of the public broadcasting company, ω, and
the ratio of the license fee to the total income of the household, I
I−FL
.
θ
10
1
X
θ∗ [1− θ∗]
1/2θ
∗
Figure 1: Determination of θ∗ in the interior equilibrium
In Figure 1, we depict the determination of θ∗ in the interior equilibrium. The inverted U-shaped
curve expresses the LHS of equation (23), and the horizontal line expresses the RHS of equation (23). As
discussed above, if the LHS of equation (23) is smaller (greater) than the RHS, θ∗ increases (decreases).
When the situation where every household is required to pay a license fee changes to the situation where
households have the option to choose scrambling, the critical value goes to θ∗ from zero. 13
In this case, households with 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗ choose scrambling, while households with θ∗ < θ ≤ 1 choose
non-scrambling, and we call this economy the “scrambled economy”. In the “scrambled economy”, the
13As shown in Figure 1, the larger of the two intersections is unstable, and we confirm that θ∗ is determined by the
smaller of the two intersections.
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equilibrium value of welfare is expressed as follows:
US =
θ∗
∫
0
USS (θ) g (θ) dθ +
1
∫
θ∗
USN (θ) g (θ) dθ (24)
Substituting (1), (19) and (20) into this equation, we obtain:
US =
θ∗ ln I
I−pP
+ ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+ 12V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ω [1− θ∗]FL
]
− 12 [θ
∗]
2
V [γsP ]
2
ω [1− θ∗]FL
. (25)
Now we compare US to UC as follows:
US − UC = −
1
2
θ∗
[
[
θ∗ −
1
2
]2
+
3
4
]
V [γsP ]
2
ωFL < 0 (26)
This equation shows that the welfare of “scrambled economy” is absolutely smaller than that of “continued
economy”.
We consider this result in detail. First, the utility of households choosing non-scrambling, θ∗ ≤ θ,
absolutely decreases as follows:
USN (θ)− UC (θ) = −θV [γsP ]2 ωθ∗pP < 0
This result indicates that the choice of scrambling by some households decreases the revenue of the
public broadcasting company, which decreases the quality of its programs. The quality decreases then
reduces the utility of households choosing non-scrambling. Second, even the utility of households choosing
scrambling can decrease. We compare USS (θ) to UC (θ) as follows:
USS (θ)− UC (θ) = ln
I
I − FL
− θV [γsP ]2 ωFL
We can easily confirm that this equation is negative (positive) when θ = θ∗ (θ = 0). We define θ∗∗ as
satisfying USS (θ∗∗) = UC (θ∗∗) as follows:
θ∗∗ =
1
X
.
Households having θ∗∗ ≤ θ < θ∗ prefer the “continued economy” to the “scrambled economy”. This
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implies that the marginal benefit of choosing scrambling is less than the marginal cost for households
having θ∗∗ ≤ θ < θ∗ as long as the quality of the public broadcasting company is kept as qP = sP [ωFL]
1
2 .
However, the quality decreases because of the decrease in revenue from the license fee as follows: qP =
sP [ω [1− θ∗]FL]
1
2 . This effect makes households having θ∗∗ ≤ θ < θ∗ choose scrambling reluctantly.
Third, households having θ < θ∗∗ willingly choose scrambling because they are not interested in watching
TV. Their utility increases because they no longer undertake wasteful expenditure. Equation (26) implies
that the first and second effects dominate the third effect. 14
When we obtain the “scrambled economy”, the horizontal line ( 1
X
) should be smaller than the maxi-
mum value of the inverted U curve in Figure 1. As the maximum value of θ [1− θ] is 14 within 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
1
X
= 1
V [γsP ]
2ωFL
ln I[I−FL] ≤
1
4 should be satisfied when the “scrambled economy” is realized. In this
case, households watch a large amount of TV program (large V ), households regard the public broad-
casting company as important (large γ), the public broadcasting company is managed efficiently (large
[sP ]
2
ωFL), and the license fee is appropriate relative to household income (large ln
I
[I−FL]
), which is to
say that the public broadcasting company is valued by many households. Then, not all households choose
scrambling, and the public broadcasting company continues to operate although its scale is reduced. As
θ∗∗ = 1
X
is satisfied, the “scrambled economy” is realized when fewer than 25% of households prefer
the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy”, USS (θ) > UC (θ), and we obtain the following
proposition. 15
Proposition 3.1. When we consider uniformly distributed heterogeneity of preferences for watching TV,
and when fewer than 25% of households prefer the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy”, we
obtain the following results.
• Granting the option to choose scrambling reduces the scale of the public broadcasting company; how-
ever, the company is not disbanded because enough households choose non-scrambling: the “scram-
bled economy” is realized.
14The aggregate utility-difference of households having 0 ≤ θ < θ∗∗ is
θ
∗∗
∫
0
[
USS (θ)− UC (θ)
]
g (θ) dθ =
1
2
[θ∗∗]2 V [γsP ]
2 ωFL, that of households having θ
∗∗ ≤ θ < θ∗ is
θ
∗
∫
θ∗∗
[
USS (θ)− UC (θ)
]
g (θ) dθ = − 1
2
[θ∗]4 V [γsP ]
2 ωFL,
and that of households having θ∗ ≤ θ ≤ 1 is
1
∫
θ∗
[
USC (θ)− UC (θ)
]
g (θ) dθ = − 1
2
[
1− [θ∗]2
]
V θ∗ [γsP ]
2 ωFL. Summing up
these equations, we obtain (25).
15As we assume a uniform distribution, the percentage preferring the “scrambled economy” is calculated as
θ
∗∗
∫
0
dθ = θ∗∗.
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• Welfare is absolutely smaller than the case where every household pays a license fee.
When the need index for public broadcasting company is small, the horizontal line ( 1
X
) becomes larger
than the maximum value of the inverted U curve, which is depicted in Figure 2.
θ
0
1
X
θ∗ [1− θ∗]
1/2 θ∗ = 1
Figure 2: Determination of θ∗ at the corner equilibrium
As depicted in Figure 2, if 1
X
is too large to intersect θ∗ [1− θ∗], the LHS of equation (22) is smaller
than the RHS for any θ. In this case, the marginal benefit of choosing scrambling is greater than the
marginal cost for every household. Therefore, θ∗ increases until it reaches the maximum region, and we
obtain the following corner solution:
θ∗ = 1, (27)
Then all household choose scrambling, and the revenue of the public broadcasting company goes to zero.
In this case, the public broadcasting company cannot continue to manage, and we call this economy the
“disbanded economy”. In this economy, the equilibrium value of welfare is as follows:
UD =
1
∫
0
USS (θ) g (θ) dθ. (28)
Substituting (1) and (19) into the above equation, we obtain:
UD = ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+
1
2
V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β
]
. (29)
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Now we compare UD to UC as follows:
UD − UC = ln
I
I − FL
−
1
2
V [γsP ]
2
ωFL (30)
The sign of equation (30) can be positive or negative. The reason why (30) can be negative is the existence
of households reluctantly choosing scrambling, as discussed above. Households having θ > θ∗∗ prefer the
“continued economy”, UD (θ) < UC (θ); however, they choose scrambling because of the reduction in
quality. From (30), on the one hand, we can confirm that when
1
4
≤
1
X
<
1
2
is satisfied, the “disbanded economy” is realized, and the welfare is smaller than that for the “continued
economy”. On the other hand, when
1
2
≤
1
X
is satisfied, the “disbanded economy” is realized, and the welfare is larger than that for the “continued
economy”.
As θ∗∗ = 1
X
is satisfied, the “disbanded economy” is realized when more than 25% of households
prefer the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy”, USS (θ) > UC (θ). Moreover, the welfare
of the “disbanded economy” is greater (smaller) than that of the “continued economy” when more (less)
than 50% of households prefer the “disbanded economy” to the “continued economy”, and we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. When we consider the uniformly distributed heterogeneity of preferences for watching
TV, and when more than 25% of households prefer the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy”,
we obtain the following results.
• Granting the option to choose scrambling causes a disbanding of the public broadcasting company:
the “disbanded economy” is realized.
• When fewer (more) than 50% of households prefer the “disbanded economy” to the “continued
economy”, welfare is smaller (larger) than the case where every household pays a license fee.
Propositions 1 and 2 offer two simple but strong messages. First, the public broadcasting company
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should be disbanded when more than 50% of households approve of this plan; otherwise, the government
should not grant the option to choose scrambling. Second, the equilibrium where only some households
choose scrambling, but other households choose non-scrambling, is undesirable.
If fewer than 50% of households approve of disbanding of the public broadcasting company, should it
continue to operate as usual without carrying out any reform of present system? The answer is “No”. It
should propose an appropriate license fee and aim for more efficient operation. From (18), we obtain the
social optimal values of FL and ω as follows:
FSOL = I −
2
V [γsP ]
2ω
ωSO = 1
. (31)
The public broadcasting company should then reduce the license fee if it is too high relative to the
desirable level, and it should eliminate wasteful expenditure, which unambiguously increases welfare.
If the public broadcasting company acts appropriately, should it operate indefinitely? The answer is
also “No”. If (31) is satisfied, we obtain:
1
V [γsP ]
2
ωSOFSOL
ln
I
I − FSOL
=
1
IV [γsP ]
2 − 2
ln
IV [γsP ]
2
2
.
Even in this case, if the following condition is satisfied, welfare increases if the public broadcasting
company is disbanded.
1
2
≤
1
IV [γsP ]
2 − 2
ln
IV [γsP ]
2
2
.
This condition is satisfied when IV [γsP ]
2 ≤ 2 is satisfied. In recent years, the amount of time spent
watching TV has been decreasing because of increased use of the Internet. 16 This result causes a decrease
in IV [γsP ]
2
. If this tendency continues, our model suggests that the public broadcasting company should
be disbanded sooner or later even if it acts appropriately. It is natural that the role of the public sector
changes following technological development and maturity of the economy, as seen in various industries
around the world, and thus we obtain the following proposition.
16According to Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan (2018), on the one hand, the average amount of
time watching TV on weekdays was 168.3 minutes per day in 2013, which decreased to 159.4 minutes per day in 2017. This
tendency is prominent in younger generations. That among teenagers was 102.5 minutes per day in 2013, which decreased
to 73.3 minutes per day in 2017. That among people in their 20s was 127.2 minutes per day in 2013, which decreased to
91.8 minutes per day in 2017. That among people in their 30s was 157.6 minutes per day in 2013, which decreased to 121.6
minutes per day in 2017. On the other hand, the average amount of time using the Internet on weekdays was 77.9 minutes
per day in 2013, which increased to 100.4 minutes per day in 2017.
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Proposition 3.3. If hours spent watching TV continues to decrease, the need index for public broadcast-
ing company continues to decrease, and the roles of the public broadcasting company will end sooner or
later even if it acts appropriately.
In this section, we compare “continued economy” with “scrambled economy” and “disbanded econ-
omy”. One may think that other policies exist that are superior to the policy granting the option to
choose scrambling. In the next section, we thus consider the effect of privatization of public broadcasting
company.
3.3 Privatized economy
In the many previous studies examining privatization, X-inefficiency, the Averch–Johnson effect, soft
budget constraint and regulatory capture are central issues. 17 It seems that privatization of the public
broadcasting company is related to the Averch–Johnson effect, soft budget constraint and regulatory
capture. 18 Although these points are important and interesting, they are beyond the scope of this
paper, and we thus leave these to future work.
In our model, we regard privatization of the public broadcasting company as a combination of disband-
ing of the public broadcasting company and the establishment of one commercial broadcasting company.
19 When the public broadcasting company is privatized, households no longer need to pay a license fee
and enjoy TV programs from n+ 1 commercial broadcasting companies. We refer to this economy as a
“privatized economy”, and its utility is then expressed as:
UP (θ) = ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n+ 1]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+ θV [n+ 1]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β , (32)
and welfare is expressed as:
UP =
1
∫
0
UP (θ) g (θ) dθ.
17X-inefficiency is an inefficiency caused by a lack of competitive pressure, which was introduced by Leibenstein (1966).
The Averch–Johnson effect is the tendency of regulated companies, such as public companies, to accumulate excessive
amounts of capital, which was introduced by Averch and Johnson (1962). Soft budget constraint is a phenomenon in which
inefficient state-owned enterprises survive through financial subsidies or other instruments, which was first discussed by
Kornai (1979). Regulatory capture is a situation in which authority is co-opted by regulated firms such as state-owned
enterprises, which was introduced by Stigler (1971).
18Public broadcasting companies have multiple channels, including satellite broadcasting, which may be excessive. It is
said that the soft budget constraint of public broadcasting companies may cause an increase in the charge for the right to
broadcast particular events. An undesirable policy may be adopted because of lobbying by a public broadcasting company.
19According to Stiglitz (2015), there are two main differences between a public company and a private company: First,
whether or not the manager of the company is elected using a public process; and second, whether or not the company has a
legal entitlement to collect a fee. Our model captures the second point that the source of income of the public broadcasting
company is forcibly collecting a license fee.
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Substituting (1 ) and (32 ) into the above equation, we obtain:
UP = ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n+ 1]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+
1
2
V [n+ 1]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β .
The difference in welfare between the “privatized economy” and the “continuation economy” is then
expressed as:
UP − UC
=
[
ln I
I−FL
− 12V [γsP ]
2
ωFL
]
+


1
2V
[
[n+ 1]
β
2−β − [n]
β
2−β
]
[sC ]
4
2−β − αβ2−β ln
[
P̄+α[n+1]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
[
P̄+α[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]


.
(33)
Comparing (30) and (33), a second set of brackets is added, which expresses the marginal effect of an
increment in the number of commercial broadcasting companies. The first term in the second set of
brackets is the marginal benefit. An increment in the number of commercial broadcasting companies
provides an increment in the number of TV programs, which increases the utility of households. The
second term in the second set of brackets is the marginal cost. An increment the number of commercial
broadcasting companies increases advertising costs, which raises the price of the consumption goods.
Households reduce their consumption because of the high price of the consumption good, which decreases
household utility. If the marginal benefit of an increment in the number of commercial broadcasting
companies is larger than the marginal cost, UP is greater than UD.
Proposition 3.4. If the number of commercial broadcasting companies is smaller than the social optimum
number, the “privatized economy” is superior to the “disbanded economy”.
4 Considering another distribution
In the previous section, we confirmed that the welfare of the “scrambled economy” is less than that of
the “continued economy”. We also confirmed that the “disbanded economy” is realized when more than
25% of households prefer the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy”, and that the welfare
of the “disbanded economy” is higher than that of the “continued economy” when more than 50% of
households prefer the “disbanded economy” to the “continued economy”. Although these results derived
from a uniform distribution are clear and significant, it is natural to wonder whether they are influenced
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by the shape of the distribution of θ. Thus, in the next subsection we consider another distribution.
4.1 Linear distribution
On the one hand, there are many households with θ < θ∗∗ when the distribution density is concentrated
around a small value of θ. Under this distribution, welfare may increase substantially because of an
increment of utility of households with θ < θ∗∗ not paying a license fee by granting the option to choose
scrambling. On the other hand, there are small households with θ < θ∗ when the distribution density is
concentrated around a large value of θ. Under this distribution, the decrease in the revenue of the public
broadcasting company is mitigated because the number of households choosing scrambling (θ < θ∗)
is small. In this case, welfare may decrease a little because of the decrease in the quality of public
broadcasting company programs. To confirm how these two conflicting effects influence our results, in
this subsection, we specify a linear distribution instead of (1) as follows:
g (θ) = aθ + 1− 12a 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 , (34)
where −2 ≤ a ≤ 2 is a parameter determining the shape of distribution as depicted in Figure 3. If a > 0
(a < 0), the distribution density is concentrated at a large (small) value of θ compared with a = 0.
θ
10
1
2
a = 2
a = 0
a = −2
Figure 3: The shape of the distribution
Under this distribution, (21) changes as follows:
ζ =
1
∫
θ∗
[
aθ + 1−
1
2
a
]
dθ = 1−
1
2
a [θ∗]
2 −
[
1−
1
2
a
]
θ∗, (35)
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and (23) changes to:
1
2
θ∗ [1− θ∗] [aθ∗ + 2] =
1
X
, (36)
In Figure 4, we depict the determination of θ∗ in the interior equilibrium when a = 2, a = 0 and a = −2.
θ
10
1
X
1
2θ
∗ [1− θ∗] [2θ∗ + 2]
1/2θ
∗
1
2θ
∗ [1− θ∗] [−2θ∗ + 2]
θ∗ [1− θ∗]
1/3
√
3/3
1
4
4
27
2
√
3
9
Figure 4: Determination of θ∗ at the interior equilibrium
When a = 0, the inverted U-shaped curve is the same as that depicted in Figure 1. From Figure 4,
we can confirm two points. First, if a > 0 (a < 0), the equilibrium value of θ∗ is smaller (larger) than the
case where a = 0 with the same value of 1
X
. This means that a smaller (larger) number of households
tend to choose scrambling when a > 0 (a < 0) compared with a = 0. Second, if a > 0 (a < 0), the
line does not intersect the inverted U-shaped curve at a higher (lower) value of 1
X
compared with a = 0.
This means that it is hard (easy) to realize the “disbanded economy” when a > 0 (a < 0) compared with
a = 0.
Welfare under the “continued economy”, (18), changes as follows:
UC =
ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+
[
1
2 +
1
12a
]
V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ωFL
]
. (37)
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Welfare under the “scrambled economy”, (25), changes as follows:
US =
[
1
2a [θ
∗]
2
+
[
1− 12a
]
θ∗
]
ln I
I−FL
+
[
ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]]
+
[
1
2 +
1
12a
]
V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ω
[
1− 12a [θ
∗]
2 −
[
1− 12a
]
θ∗
]
FL
]
−
[
1
3a [θ
∗]
3
+ 12
[
1− 12a
]
[θ∗]
2
]
V [γsP ]
2
ω
[
1− 12a [θ
∗]
2 −
[
1− 12a
]
θ∗
]
FL
, (38)
and (26) changes to:
US − UC = V [γsP ]2 ωFL [θ∗]




1
2 [θ
∗] [aθ∗ + 2] [1− θ∗]
[
1
6a [θ
∗] + 12
[
1− 12a
]]
−
[
1
2 +
1
12a
] [
1
2a [θ
∗] +
[
1− 12a
]]




(39)
We confirm that the sign of the above equation is negative in Appendix 1. The “scrambled economy” is
then worse off than the “continued economy” even though we consider a monotonic upward (downward)
distribution.
Next, we examine the threshold where the “disbanded economy” is realized by granting the option to
choose scrambling. We consider two extreme cases where a = −2 and a = 2 are satisfied. In the former
(latter) case, the density of θ is most concentrated around a small (large) value of θ within the linear
distribution. From (36), the condition for generalizing the “scrambled economy” is as follows:
1
X
≤ 427 when a = −2
1
X
≤ 2
√
3
9 when a = 2
. (40)
We can confirm θ satisfying USS (θ∗∗) = UC (θ∗∗) is calculated as θ∗∗ = 1
X
. We can then find the
threshold as follows:
4
27
∫
0
[−2θ + 2] dθ = 200729 when a = −2
2
√
3
9
∫
0
[2θ] dθ = 427 when a = 2
. (41)
This equation means that the “disbanded economy” is realized when more than 27% (15%) of households
prefer the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy” when a = −2 (a = 2). From (40), because
4
27 <
2
√
3
9 is satisfied, it is easy (difficult) to realize the “disbanded economy” with the same level of
1
X
when a = −2 (a = 2) compared with a = 0. From (41), because 200729 >
4
27 is satisfied, a larger (smaller)
percentage of households prefer the “scrambled economy” to the “continued economy” at the threshold
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where the “disbanded economy” is realized when a = −2 (a = 2) compared with a = 0. When (40) is not
satisfied, the “disbanded economy” is realized. In this case, the equilibrium value of welfare (29) changes
as follows:
UD = ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+
[
1
12
a+
1
2
]
V
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β
]
. (42)
and (30) changes to:
UD − UC = ln
I
I − FL
−
[
1
2
+
1
12
a
]
V [γsP ]
2
ωFL (43)
The sign of equation (43) can be positive or negative. We can show the condition where the welfare of
the “disbanded economy” is larger than that of the “continued economy” as follows:
1
3 <
1
X
when a = −2
2
3 <
1
X
when a = 2
. (44)
We can then find the threshold where the “disbanded economy” is better off than the “continued economy”
as follows:
1
3
∫
0
[−2θ + 2] dθ = 59 when a = −2
2
3
∫
0
[2θ] dθ = 49 when a = 2
(45)
This equation means that the “disbanded economy” is better off than the “continued economy” when
more than 55% (44%) of households prefer the former economy when a = −2 (a = 2). From (44), because
1
3 <
2
3 is satisfied, it is easy (difficult) to increase welfare by granting the option to choose scrambling with
the same level of 1
X
when a = −2 (a = 2) compared with a = 0. From (45), because 59 >
4
9 is satisfied,
a larger (smaller) percentage of households prefer the “disbanded economy” to the “continued economy”
at the threshold where the “disbanded economy” is better than the “continued economy” when a = −2
(a = 2) compared with a = 0.
From the above discussion, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. When we consider the heterogeneity of preferences for watching TV under a linear
distribution, we get the following results.
• The welfare of the “scrambled economy” is absolutely smaller than that of the “continued economy”
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even when we consider a monotonic upward (downward) distribution.
• Compared with the uniform distribution case, it is easy (difficult) to realize the “disbanded economy”
with the same level of 1
X
when the density of θ is concentrated around a small (large) value of θ.
• Compared with the uniform distribution case, a larger (smaller) percentage of households prefer the
“scrambled economy” to the “continued economy” at the threshold where the “disbanded economy”
is realized when the density of θ is concentrated around a small (large) value of θ.
• Compared with the uniform distribution case, it is easy (difficult) to increase welfare by granting the
option to choose scrambling with the same level of 1
X
when the density of θ is concentrated around
a small (large) value of θ.
• Compared with the uniform distribution case, a larger (smaller) percentage of households prefer the
“disbanded economy” to the “continued economy” at the threshold where the “disbanded economy”
is better off than the “continued economy” when the density of θ is concentrated around a small
(large) value of θ.
This proposition suggests that the shape of the distribution has an impact on the level of 1
X
at which
the “disbanded economy” is realized and preferred. Moreover, the required percentage of households that
hope the public broadcasting company is disbanded for the “disbanded economy” is also influenced by the
shape of the distribution. However, we cannot find any result that the “scrambled economy” produces
better outcomes than the “continued economy” even when we generalize to the linear distribution.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed a tractable model to examine the effect of scrambling, disbanding and priva-
tization of a public broadcasting company. Our model provided six interesting results. First, the situation
where every household pays a license fee (the “continued economy”) is superior to the situation where
only some households choose scrambling (the “scrambled economy”) and where the public broadcast-
ing company is disbanded (the “disbanded economy”) when the need index for the public broadcasting
company is sufficiently high. Second, there is no case where the “scrambled economy” is superior to the
“continued economy” in our model. Third, the “disbanded economy” is superior to the “continued econ-
omy” when the need index for the public broadcasting company is low. Fourth, the “disbanded economy”
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is superior to the “continued economy” even if the public broadcasting company acts appropriately when
the need index for the public broadcasting company is sufficiently low. Fifth, the “disbanded economy” is
superior to the “continued economy” when more than half of households approve of the disbanded public
broadcasting company under a uniform distribution; however, this percentage is crucially dependent on
the shape of the distribution. Sixth, the “privatized economy” is superior to the “disbanded economy” if
the number of commercial broadcasting companies is smaller than the social optimum number.
Although these results are clear and intuitive, there is potential to extend our models. As we aim
to construct a tractable model, we adopted some simplifying assumptions: no consideration of dynamic
effect, omitted labor markets, no consideration of substitution between watching TV and enjoying other
leisure activities, no consideration of externalities, etc. Changing these assumptions may change our
results, which is worth investigating in the future.
Our model is simple enough to allow extensions in several directions. For example, one may con-
sider the heterogeneity among commercial broadcasting companies, and examine another issue: how the
strategic behavior of heterogeneous commercial broadcasting companies, such as negotiation on viewer
rating and advertising revenue, affects the key endogenous variables. Another may consider the effect
of advertising in order to examine how the competitive environment among commercial broadcasting
companies influences the price of consumption goods. Finally, we could thoroughly consider the inef-
ficiency of public broadcasting companies under, for example, the Averch–Johnson effect, soft budget
constraints and regulatory capture. Consideration of such factors would provide valuable insights into
the privatization process.
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A Appendix A
In this appendix, we confirm US − UC < 0 under a linear distribution, g (θ) =
[
aθ + 1− 12a
]
. We set
Z (θ) ≡
1
2
θ [1− θ] [aθ + 2] .
Note that Z (θ) intersect the horizontal axis at θ = 0, θ = 1 and θ = − 2
a
. Differentiating the above
equation with θ, we obtain:
Z ′ (θ) =
1
2
[
−3aθ2 + [2a− 4] θ + 2
]
,
then Z (θ) takes the maximum or minimum value at θ̂ = a−23a ±
[
[
a−2
3a
]2
+ 23a
]
1
2
.
When −2 ≤ a < 0, − 2
a
≥ 1 is satisfied, and then Z (θ) takes the maximum value at θ̂ = a−23a −
[
[
a−2
3a
]2
+ 23a
]
1
2
within 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Differentiating θ̂ = a−23a −
[
[
a−2
3a
]2
+ 23a
]
1
2
with a, we obtain:
∂θ̂
∂a
=
6
[3a]
2
[
1 +
1
2
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4]
]
.
The sign of the above equation is positive within −2 ≤ a < 0.
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When 0 < a ≤ 2, − 2
a
< 0 is satisfied, and then Z (θ) takes the maximum value at θ̂ = a−23a +
[
[
a−2
3a
]2
+ 23a
]
1
2
. Differentiating θ̂ = a−23a +
[
[
a−2
3a
]2
+ 23a
]
1
2
with a, we obtain:
∂θ̂
∂a
=
6
[3a]
2
[
1−
1
2
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4]
]
.
Differentiating − 12
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4] with a, we obtain:
∂
∂a
[
− 12
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4]
]
= − 12
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12
[
1− [a
2+5a+4]
[a2+2a+4]
] .
The sign of the above equation is positive within 0 < a ≤ 2, then − 12
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4] takes the
minimum value at a = 0 within 0 ≤ a ≤ 2 as:
lim
a→0
[
1−
1
2
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4]
]
= 0,
then the sign of ∂θ̂
∂a
is positive within 0 < a ≤ 2. Therefore, we can confirm the following:
∂θ̂
∂a
> 0 for −2 ≤ a ≤ 2 . (46)
When θ takes the maximum value,
[
aθ̂ + 2
] [
1− θ̂
]
= θ̂
[
2aθ̂ − a+ 2
]
is satisfied. Substituting this
equation into Z (θ), we obtain:
Z
(
θ̂
)
=
1
2
[
θ̂
]2 [
a
[
2θ̂ − 1
]
+ 2
]
,
Differentiating the above equation with a, we obtain:
∂Z
(
θ̂
)
∂a
=
1
2
θ̂
[
θ̂
[
2θ̂ − 1
]
+ 2
[
a
[
3θ̂ − 1
]
+ 2
] ∂θ̂
∂a
]
.
When a > 0, θ̂ > 12 and
∂θ̂
∂a
> 0 are satisfied, and then
∂Z(θ̂)
∂a
> 0 is satisfied.
When −2 ≤ a < 0, ∂θ̂
∂a
= 6
[3a]2
[
1 + 12
[
a2 + 2a+ 4
]− 12 [a+ 4]
]
is satisfied. Substituting this equation
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into
∂Z(θ̂)
∂a
, we obtain:
∂Z
(
θ̂
)
∂a
=
1
2
θ̂



θ̂
[
3θ̂ − 1
]
+ 6
[
a
[
3θ̂ − 1
]
+ 2
]
[a+ 4]
[3a]
2
[a2 + 2a+ 4]
1
2
+
12a
[
3θ̂ − 1
]
+ 24− [3a]2
[
θ̂
]2
[3a]
2



.
The first term is nonnegative because θ̂ ≥ 13 is satisfied when −2 ≤ a. The second term is also positive
because a
[
3θ̂ − 1
]
+ 2 takes the smallest value 1 at a = −2 and θ̂ = 12 within −2 ≤ a < 0,
1
3 ≤ θ̂ ≤
1
2 .
The numerator of third term is rewritten as follows:
−9
[
aθ̂ − 2
]2
− 12a+ 60,
which takes the smallest value at θ̂ = 12 within
1
3 ≤ θ̂ ≤
1
2 , a < 0. Then the following condition is
satisfied:
−9
[
aθ̂ − 2
]2
− 12a+ 60 ≥ −
9
4
[
a−
4
3
]2
+ 28.
The RHS of this equation takes the smallest value at a = −2 within −2 ≤ a ≤ 0, and we can confirm
it is positive. Then the third term is also positive, and we confirm that
∂Z(θ̂)
∂a
> 0 within −2 ≤ a < 0.
Therefore, we confirm the following:
∂Z(θ̂)
∂a
> 0 for −2 ≤ a ≤ 2 . (47)
From (46) and (47), Z (θ) = 12θ [1− θ] [aθ + 2] <
1
4 is satisfied within −2 ≤ a < 0, 0 ≤ θ <
1
2 . Then
from (39), the following condition is satisfied:
US − UC < V [γsP ]2 ωFL [θ∗]




1
4
[
1
6a [θ
∗] + 12
[
1− 12a
]]
−
[
1
2 +
1
12a
] [
1
2a [θ
∗] +
[
1− 12a
]]




.
Rewriting the above equation, we obtain:
US − UC < V [γsP ]2 ωFL [θ∗]
[[
−
5
24
−
1
24
a
]
a [θ∗] +
[
−
3
8
−
1
12
a
] [
1−
1
2
a
]]
.
As
[
− 524 −
1
24a
]
a > 0 within −2 ≤ a < 0, the above equation takes the maximum value at θ∗ = 12 within
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1
3 ≤ θ
∗ ≤ 12 , and we obtain:
US − UC
< V [γsP ]
2
ωFL [θ
∗]
[[
− 524 −
1
24a
]
a
[
1
2
]
+
[
− 38 −
1
12a
] [
1− 12a
]]
= V [γsP ]
2
ωFL [θ
∗]
[
1
48a
2 − 38
]
.
The above equation takes the maximum value at a = −2 within −2 ≤ a < 0, and we obtain:
US − UC < V [γsP ]2 ωFL [θ∗]
[
1
12
−
3
8
]
< 0.
From (46) and (47), 12 [θ] [aθ + 2] [1− θ] ≤
[
1
3
]
1
2
[
2
3
]
is satisfied within 0 < a ≤ 2. Then, from (39),
the following condition is satisfied:
US − UC ≤ V [γsP ]2 ωFL [θ∗]




[
1
3
]
1
2
[
2
3
] [
1
6a [θ
∗] + 12
[
1− 12a
]]
−
[
1
2 +
1
12a
] [
1
2a [θ
∗] +
[
1− 12a
]]




.
Rewriting the above equation, we obtain:
US − UC ≤ V [γsP ]2 ωFL [θ∗]
[[[√
3
27
−
6
24
]
−
1
24
a
]
a [θ∗] +
[[√
3
9
−
4
8
]
−
1
12
a
]
[
1−
1
2
a
]
]
.
We can confirm that the above equation is unambiguously negative within 0 < a ≤ 2. Therefore, we can
confirm the following condition:
US − UC < 0 for −2 ≤ a ≤ 2 . (48)
B Appendix B
One may doubt that the existence of households that unwillingly choose scrambling, θ∗∗ ≤ θ ≤ θ∗, is a
key reason why the “scrambled economy” is worse off than the “continued economy”. In this appendix,
28
we then consider the situation where only two types of households exist as follows:
θ = θL with δ
θ = θH with 1− δ
, (49)
where 0 ≤ θL < θH is satisfied. In this discrete setting, the welfare of the “continued economy” is
expressed as:
UC = δ




ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+θLV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ωFL
]




+[1− δ]




ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+θHV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
ωFL
]




.
(50)
When households have the option to choose scrambling, there are three equilibrium.
First, if θL ≥ 1X is satisfied, both households having θ = θL and households having θ = θH choose
non-scrambling. In this case, the welfare of the economy is the same as in (50).
Second, if θL <
1
X
≤ [1− δ] θH is satisfied, households having θ = θL choose scrambling, however,
households having θ = θH choose non-scrambling. In this case, the “scrambled economy” is realized, and
the welfare is expressed as follows:
US = δ




ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+θLV [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β




+ [1− δ]




ln [I − FL]− ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+θHV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β + [γsP ]
2
[1− δ]ωFL
]




.
(51)
Third, if [1− δ] θH < 1X is satisfied, both households having θ = θL and households having θ = θH
choose scrambling. In this case, the “disbanded economy” is realized, and the welfare is expressed as
follows:
UD = δ




ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+θLV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β
]




+ [1− δ]




ln I − ln
[
P̄ + α [n]
β
2−β [sC ]
2β
2−β
]
+θHV
[
[n]
β
2−β [sC ]
4
2−β
]




. (52)
Now we compare UC and US . From (50) and (51), the welfare of the “continued economy” is greater
than that of the “scrambled economy”, UC > US , if the following condition is satisfied:
θL <
1
X
≤ θL + θH [1− δ] .
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When the “scrambled economy” is realized, θL <
1
X
≤ [1− δ] θH is satisfied, and the above condition is
definitely satisfied. Therefore, even considering the discrete distribution, we cannot find situation that
the “scrambled economy” is superior to the “continued economy”. In this case, the effect that the utility
of households having θ = θL increases because they do not pay a license fee is smaller than the effect
that the utility of households having θ = θH decreases because of the decrease in the quality of public
broadcasting company programs.
Finally, we compare UC and UD. From (50) and (52), the welfare of the “continued economy” is
greater than that of the “disbanded economy”, UC ≥ UD, if the following condition is satisfied:
[1− δ] θH <
1
X
≤ δθL + [1− δ] θH .
When the above condition is satisfied, households having θ = θH prefer the “continued economy” to the
“disbanded economy”, 1
X
< θH . Furthermore, the effect that the utility of households having θ = θL
increases because they do not have to pay a license fee is smaller than the effect that the utility of
households having θ = θH decreases because they unwillingly choose scrambling.
Even when 1
X
< θH is satisfied, the welfare of the “disbanded economy” can be greater than that of
the “continued economy”, UD > UC , if the following condition is satisfied:
θH − δ [θH − θL] ≤
1
X
< θH .
In this case, the effect that the utility of households having θ = θL increases because they do not have to
pay a license fee is greater than the effect that the utility of households having θ = θH decreases because
they unwillingly choose scrambling.
When households having θ = θH prefer the “disbanded economy” to the “continued economy”, θH <
1
X
, the welfare of the “disbanded economy” is greater than that of the “continued economy”. This is
because the utility of both households having θ = θL and households having θ = θH increases because
they do not have to pay a license fee.
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